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Disaster Governance and Hybrid Organizations: Accounting, 
Performance Challenges and Evacuee Housing  
 
Abstract  
Purpose: This paper investigates how public/private hybrid and ambiguous organizations played 
pivotal roles in a governmental programme of housing reconstruction following a major earthquake 
in central Italy in 2009. Venturing beyond the boundaries of institutional isomorphism and using a 
Foucauldian approach, the longitudinal analysis seeks to illuminate accounting and performance 
challenges and provide insights to the calculative techniques associated with evacuee housing.  
Design/methodology/approach: In ‘act 1’ the paper investigates the role of a consortium created 
during the recovery stage of the disaster to construct temporary housing. In ‘act 2’ attention shifts to 
consortia established for the reconstruction of buildings in devastated communities. The total 
observation period is 11 years. 31 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 key-actors. A 
broad range of official documents was also consulted.  
Findings: In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake a comprehensive reporting system was 
established to facilitate the construction of 19 new towns for 15,000 evacuees. The mix of 
accountants, engineers and architects who developed the system and a building prototype evidences 
the assembly of diverse calculative techniques by different experts and the de-territorialization of 
subject disciplines. During reconstruction technologies of government included the introduction of 
standardized systems and vocabularies that homogenised administrative procedures among diverse 
experts.  
Research implications: The paper provides academics and policy makers with insights to 
accounting, performance management and accountability in hybrid organizations in the largely 
unexplored realm of post-disaster evacuee housing. Further studies are needed to examine the 
politics of calculation in similar contexts. 
Originality/value: The paper fills a gap in the literature by exploring the role played by individual 
experts working for hybrid organizations. Further, by exploring actual practices over an extended 
period of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, the study highlights how experts intervened to 
solve problems at the meso-political level and at the micro-organizational level. 










According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, in recent decades geophysical 
events such as earthquakes and tsunamis have resulted in more deaths than any other form of 
disaster (UNISDR, 2018). The 563 earthquakes that took place between 1998 and 2017 killed 
747,234 people and resulted in the injury, homelessness and displacement of numerous others. 
These seismic events affected 125 million people and resulted in economic losses of US$661 
billion. An increasing feature of relief and recovery from geophysical and climate-related disasters 
is the key role played by hybrid organizations, structures and networks. The urgency, scale and 
complexity of disaster management demands multi-organisational collaboration (Hermansson, 
2016; Parlak and Gunduz, 2015). In these crisis situations interdisciplinary expertise may be drawn 
from diverse institutions and individuals in the public, private and not-for-profit worlds (Coppola, 
2015, pp. 461-680). Using a variety of documentary sources as well as interviews with key 
participants, the current study analyses the role of hybrid and ambiguous organizations in the 
Abruzzo region of Italy following a seismic event of magnitude 6.3 that occurred on 6 April 2009. 
This was “a moderate earthquake, albeit with immoderate effects” (Alexander, 2010, p. 327). It 
killed 308 people, injured 1,500 and left 67,500 homeless (Alexander, 2010, 2013; Costa and 
Simeone, 2009; Dante et al., 2009). The costs of reconstruction were estimated at more than €13bn 
(Kieffer, 2013, p. 258). 
 
Given the enormous public expenditure on reconstruction, their social impacts on territories and 
populations, and the attendant issues of accounting and accountability to which they give rise, it is 
surprising that natural disasters have received limited attention from the interdisciplinary 
accounting community. Among impediments to such research is accessing source material and the 




reconstruction. The latter requires multi-year observations in a range of impacted spaces 
(Alexander, 2002; Birkland, 2006; Coppola, 2015; Sylves, 2008).  
 
The current study seeks to make a number of interrelated contributions. Firstly, we aim to augment 
knowledge on the intersection between disaster government and hybrid organizations. Although a 
number of accounting studies in recent decades have investigated hybridisation processes and 
hybrid organizations in diverse contexts (Kurunmäki, 2004; Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Miller et 
al., 2008; Thomasson, 2009; Grossi and Thomasson, 2015; Grossi et al., 2017; Johanson and 
Vakkuri, 2017; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019), researchers have yet to explore the functioning of 
hybrid organizations in short and long-term humanitarian operations following natural disasters. In 
this study we initially focus, in ‘act 1’, on a consortium that was created one month after the focal 
earthquake to activate a national governmental programme for the urgent building of temporary 
housing. Attention later shifts, in ‘act 2’, to consortia formed to reconstruct buildings in devastated 
areas. These consortia requested public funds, and planned and coordinated reconstruction on behalf 
of their local communities. We report the results of longitudinal research that unveils accounting, 
performance challenges and evacuee housing calculations over the periods of post-earthquake 
recovery and reconstruction. By focusing our research on an extended period and by engaging with 
participants who occupied a wide range of roles, we seek to gain insights to “actual practices” 
(Grossi et al., 2020, p. 271).  
 
Secondly, another theme that deserves greater attention in the literature on hybridity, and where 
there have been calls for further insights, is the role played by individuals (Grossi et al., 2017, p. 
383). The current study will highlight how various experts effectively translated governmental 
programmes into practices during the emergency and reconstruction stages of the focal disaster. It 
will also seek to demonstrate how these individuals intervened to solve problems at the meso- 




Thirdly, we seek to augment the accounting literature on natural disasters. While a number of 
pioneering works have analysed accounting (Lai et al., 2014; Sargiacomo et al., 2014, Sargiacomo, 
2015; Walker, 2014; Perkiss and Moerman, 2020) and accountability (Baker, 2014; Taylor et al., 
2014; Sciulli, 2018) issues in relation to these events, the role played by calculative practice in 
specific aspects of recovery and reconstruction (such as developing temporary and permanent 
housing solutions) has been limited (Quarantelli, 1982)1.  
 
A fourth intended contribution is theoretical. Most of the recent research on hybridity has been 
supported by institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2010; Battilana and Lee, 2014; Argento et al., 
2016; Skelcher and Smith, 2017; Olsen et al., 2017), and by variants of institutional theory such as 
historical institutionalism (Christensen, 2017), as well as by property rights theory (Vining and 
Weimer, 2016). Contrary to these theoretical preferences, and with the intention of going beyond 
the boundaries of institutional isomorphism (Grossi et al., 2020), the current research adopts a 
Foucauldian approach. It seeks to augment prior studies on the “art of government” and the role of 
calculative practices as “technologies of government” (Foucault, 1991, 2007; Miller and Rose, 
1990; Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller, 2001) by focussing on the mechanisms used in a longitudinal 
case of post-disaster management. We study the technologies deployed in the recovery and 
reconstruction of an impacted territory and its population. 
 
We begin, in section 2, by describing our theoretical framing and stating the main assumptions that 
guide our study. Following this, in section 3, we briefly discuss our research methods and sources. 
In section 4 we provide background to the focal case by narrating the governmental responses to the 
emergency and the classification of territories and populations impacted by the earthquake. Section 
                                                             
1 There have been exceptions in the wider social sciences where researchers have performed extended longitudinal 
studies of managerial and policy aspects of post-earthquake reconstruction (e.g., Haas, Kates and Bowden, 1977; 




5 examines the first ‘act’ in our longitudinal analysis. This initially concerns the emergence of 
Consortium Forcase as a hybrid organization and proceeds to show how the recovery and 
reconstruction project was planned using a ‘building prototype design’. This section also discusses 
the main calculative practices and performance challenges that attended the planning, funding, 
construction, time-space reporting and controlling of new towns built to provide temporary housing 
for evacuees. Section 6 concerns the second ‘act’ in our longitudinal case. Here we investigate the 
nature and operation of reconstruction consortia established for the rebuilding of devastated homes 
and the attempt to provide permanent housing for evacuees. These actions required the concurrent 
deployment of accounting, administrative, architectural and engineering expertise. In Section 7 we 
offer a concluding discussion. 
 
2. The art of government following a disaster  
 
Much time has passed since studies in accounting began to explore the use of technologies of 
calculation in the government of organizations and societies. Such studies produced a number of 
contributions relating to historical (Miller, 1990; Neu, 2000; Walker, 2004; Servalli, 2013) and 
contemporary (Preston et al., 1997; Radcliffe, 1999; Graham, 2010; Argento et al., 2019) settings. 
Through this literature, the role of accounting in the government of populations became an 
established theme. More recently, attention has also focussed on the role of calculation in territorial 
strategies as well as population (Elden, 2007; Mennicken and Miller, 2012).  
 
In his lectures on Security, Territory and Population given in 1978 Foucault (2007) sought to 
further explore the issue of government (Elden, 2007). He asserted that the emergence of the 
problem of population generated new technologies in the ‘art of government’ including calculative 




territory were intertwined - the territory it inhabits is fundamental to comprehending a population. 
Foucault referred to instances where states ‘policed’ communities by first ascertaining their 
territories as well those who lived in them (2007, pp. 320-323). It follows that the government of 
both territory and population require calculative mechanisms. As Elden (2007) notes, the mapping, 
ordering and measurement of territory, as well as the manner in which territory is normalised and 
regulated are ‘calculative’. Mennicken and Miller (2012, p. 4) argue that calculative instruments 
“transform not only the possibilities for personhood, they also construct the physical and abstract 
calculable spaces that individuals inhabit”. Foucault’s insights on the ‘politics of habitat’, the 
structuring of space and the construction and reconstruction of towns (Foucault, 2007, pp. 14-20), 
have also informed studies in human geography (Elden, 2016, pp. 87-92; Crampton and Elden, 
2007, pp. 71-75).  
 
It is worth noting that Foucault’s observations on territory and population included brief 
consideration of the implications of disasters. He reflected on the state’s protection of territories and 
populations from dangers and crises. He referred to how, historically, the problem of “population 
was posed in relation to the desert or desertification due to major human catastrophes” (2007, p. 
67). Indeed, for Foucault (2007, p. 67) the emergence of the problem of ““population” was 
understood as the movement by which a deserted territory was repopulated after a great disaster, be 
it an epidemic, war, or food shortage…in which people died with spectacular rapidity and 
intensity”. Foucault explained how the emphasis later shifted to preserving the security of the 
population, particularly at moments of crisis. From the eighteenth century, disruptive events such as 
epidemics became the subject of intervention not only in the form of medical treatments but also in 
the deployment of quantitative instruments to ascertain risk and measure mortality and morbidity 
(2007, pp. 58-62). In this way those impacted by such adversities were constructed as “a 




here that a Foucauldian framework offers insights to the government of disasters and the politics of 
calculation in the context of hybrid organizations.  
 
Contributions by Miller and Rose (1990) and Rose and Miller (1992) are also instructive when 
investigating the ‘problematics of government’ in the aftermath of natural disasters, both in relation 
to programmes of intervention and the technologies elaborated by different groups of experts. Such 
crises are arenas where a “complex assemblage of diverse forces - legal, architectural, professional, 
administrative, financial, judgmental” may be mobilised (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 183). Disasters 
are settings for the activation of the ‘exceptional’ government of economic life, of populations, 
welfare, resources and territories.  
 
Given that knowledge is central to the “activities of government and to the very formation of its 
objects” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 175), the process of constructing knowledge about impacted 
territories and populations in a disaster recovery scenario may demand a range of activities. These 
include the comprehensive identification, calculation and classification of each impacted family and 
building. And here the relevance of accounting emerges as a territorializing activity “by making 
physical spaces calculable” (Mennicken and Miller, 2012, p. 20, emphasis in original). Calculative 
technologies are pivotal to the acquisition and accumulation of knowledge in the areas impacted by 
disasters. As Miller and Rose (1990, p. 7) reminded us, programmes of government depend on “the 
construction of devices for the inscription of reality in a form where it can be debated and 
diagnosed”. The diverse technologies of government that might be utilized after a natural disaster 
include the following: “techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of 
examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such 




of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building designs and architectural forms” (Rose and 
Miller, 1992, p. 183). 
 
Other commentators have also identified technologies of government that may feature in post 
disaster scenarios. Bowker and Star (1999, pp. 10-13, 137-139), for example, articulate the 
importance of classification, that is, the “spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the 
world”. They also refer to the significance of “list making”, an activity fundamental to 
“coordinating activity distributed in time and space”. Maps too are key devices for representing 
impacted territories and populations. They “are both a product of and intervention in a distributed 
series of political knowledges” (Crampton, 2007, p. 224).   
 
In the aftermath of catastrophes a broad variety of expertise may be required for “problematizing 
new issues” and determining interventions (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 188). Disasters may require 
the presence of a wide range of government officials and “technicians of space” such as architects 
and engineers to inspect and assess building damage, repair and reconstruct buildings, and 
implement short-term housing solutions.  Experts are needed to map areas, and define the zones 
where new settlements are to be constructed (Foucault, 2007, pp. 12-20). Experts not only plan and 
design building space, they are also concerned with the wider ‘politics of habitat’, embracing issues 
such as public hygiene and creating ‘green’ spaces (Elden, 2016, pp. 87-90). Experts may also be 
involved in the allocation of evacuees to houses. This may be achieved by constructing ‘social lists’ 
(Walker, 2004; Servalli, 2013). Such devices become tools for the “spatial distribution of 
individuals” (Elden, 2016, p. 88). Experts are also important for designing performance 
management systems that facilitate the control and monitoring of on-site operations ‘at a distance’ 
by the central state (Latour, 1987; Robson, 1991, 1992). Administrative experts translate post-




3. Research method and sources  
This paper forms part of a research project embracing an 11-year observation period that 
commenced immediately after the focal earthquake in 2009. Interviews for the current investigation 
began in 2016, following the publication of initial studies on the disaster (Sargiacomo et al, 2014; 
Sargiacomo, 2015). Our use of retrospective interviews with various experts permitted the gathering 
of information about the use of calculative technologies relating to impacted populations and 
territories. Our approach built on the assumption that prominent actors are best placed to 
communicate information about such practices and the contexts in which they were utilized 
(Bertaux and Kholi, 1984, p. 226).  
 
Our connections with the Head of the Administration and Accounting Office in the Civil Defence 
Department (who became Head of the Civil Defence department in 2017) facilitated the 
identification of significant actors to interview. Among the interviewees were the President of the 
Reconstruction Consortium, the Director of the Special Office of Reconstruction, the Governor of 
the Abruzzo Region, the Mayor of L’Aquila, and consortia partners drawn from engineering and 
construction concerns. Information about the interviewees is provided in Appendix B. Semi-
structured interviews with key actors were supplemented by follow-up communications to obtain 
clarifications and additional material. A total of 31 semi-structured interviews with 15 interviewees 
were scheduled. Interviews were conducted through the data gathering and analysis phases of the 
project until a point of saturation was reached by November 2019 (Bertaux and Kholi, 1984, p. 
226).  
 
Over the period of study, a considerable volume of national, regional and local government decrees, 
circulars and ordinances became available, as well as a variety of newspaper and media articles (see 




identification of potential interviewees. Printed sources also included civil defence reports and 
papers relating to the Forcase Consortium and the Forcase project. These documentary materials 
offered confirmation of the data obtained from oral testimonies. 
 
In the next section we explore the art of government in action during the emergency stage of the 
natural disaster, and identify the major actors in the observation field.  
4. The art of government during the emergency phase: the classification of impacted 
territories and populations 
 
On 6 April 2009, when the earthquake struck L’Aquila, the Italian Government declared a “state of 
risk” and later announced a national state of emergency (Decrees of the President of the Council of 
Ministries). According to Italian Law (n.225, 24 February 1992, art.2) a ‘state of emergency’ can 
only be declared when a natural calamity, catastrophe or other event occurs that, due to its 
“intensity and scope, requires the application of extraordinary means and powers” (Bignami, 2010). 
This normally arises when an earthquake is equal to, or higher than, 6 on the Mercalli scale (Lee et 
al., 2002), or its equivalent on the Richter scale (Richter, 1935). The seismological classification of 
the event effectively triggers a shift from ‘normal’ government to ‘exceptional’ government, and 
generates responses in defined territories and populations. In 2009 the then Head of Civil Defence 
was appointed as Commissioner delegated to guide post-disaster operations. The Department of 
Civil Defence, which connected local and provincial governments impacted by the quake, 
commenced a number of activities, ranging from search and rescue operations, to assembling tents, 
establishing reception areas for the displaced population, organizing hotel accommodation, and 
providing meals and healthcare assistance.  
 
For the purposes of this study it is important to note that the Civil Defence Department developed 




2009). These practices were focussed on the territorial demarcation of the disaster space and the 
affected buildings and populations therein. Mapping was used as a mechanism of calculation. It was 
elemental to representing and partitioning the territories and populations struck by the quake and to 
thus identifying those deemed eligible for post-earthquake assistance and reconstruction funds. The 
affected territory was defined on maps as the “seismic crater space” and comprised municipalities 
where the earthquake registered 6 degrees or higher on the Mercalli scale (Department of Civil 
Defence – hereafter DCD - n.3, 16 April 2009). Following this assessment, the City of L’Aquila 
was listed as “top priority” and 56 seriously damaged towns were identified in the Abruzzo region 
as “second priority” (DCD, n.11, 17 July 2009). The area included in the ‘seismic crater’ (see 
Figure 1) was 2,387 km2. Its population was 144,757.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
These territories were eligible to obtain extra public monies in the aftermath of the disaster, and 
their citizens were entitled to financial benefits such as income tax exemption and healthcare fee 
exoneration.  
 
In order to facilitate their governance, further gradations of impacted urban spaces were introduced. 
Buildings were classified with a view to assessing damage, safety and usability. Five categories of 
buildings were identified. Type A were “structurally safe buildings” to which residents were 
allowed to return. Buildings classified as type B-C were deemed “temporarily unsafe buildings, but 
safe following first intervention measures”. Type D buildings were “temporarily unsafe and to be 
further assessed”, while buildings classified as E or F constituted a “Red Zone”, of “unsafe” 
properties. The results of the enumeration of buildings according to this classification were reported 





Table 1: The Classification of Buildings in the ‘Seismic Crater’  
Number of buildings classified by use 
Private Public Hospitals Barracks Schools Productive 
27,249 722 38 109 434 1,157 
Percentage of buildings classified by use  
Classification Private Public Hospitals Barracks Schools Productive2 
A 52.7% 54.4% 52.6% 68.8% 53.2% 58.2% 
B 14.6% 17.7% 18.4% 24.8% 26.5% 17.6% 
C 2.8% 4.6% 15.8% 2.8% 2.3% 4.3% 
D 1.2% 2.1% 2.6%  3.5%  
E 24.4% 18.8% 10.5% 3.7% 12.9% 15.0% 
F 4.4% 2.4%   1.6% 4.0% 
Source: Undersecretary of the State, Application for Assistance from the European Union Solidarity 
Fund (EUSF) (2009, p. 41). 
These classifications, in tandem with methods of territorial partitioning and codification, paved the 
way for the management of the transition from the emergency to the reconstruction stage of the 
trauma.  
 
In the aftermath of a disaster there is invariably an urgent need to find accommodation solutions. 
Prior literature points to distinctive phases of ‘emergency sheltering’, ‘temporary sheltering’, 
‘temporary housing’ and ‘permanent housing’ (Quarantelli, 1982, p. 2; 1998). These sheltering and 
housing phases do not necessarily “progress in a neat linear fashion” (Quarantelli, 1982, p. 78). In 
the former (sheltering) stage temporary sheltering may be found in tents, barracks, sport halls and 
hotels. In the latter (housing) stage temporary accommodation may take the form of rented houses, 
mobile homes or purpose-built prefabricated buildings. Permanent housing comprises the 
                                                             
2 The column total is 99.1%. This and other arithmetical errors in tables and figures reproduced in this paper (likely 




reconstruction of devastated properties or the construction of new houses for impacted individuals 
and families. 
 
In our focal case the state, through Civil Defence operations, established a series of “temporary 
housing” solutions for evacuees including renting homes and access to wooden houses. 
Prefabricated housing solutions3 were also planned. These were restricted to citizens formerly 
resident in buildings classified as “E” and “F” or “Red Zone” (per above) in the town of L’Aquila. 
Indeed, the inhabitants of the latter buildings suffered most economic loss, and would wait several 
years before re-accessing their reconstructed homes.  
 
The inspection, assessment and classification of damaged buildings were essential to implementing 
the programme of temporary housing. The first technical-financial model of housing need issued on 
16 April 2009 was intended to allocate only 3,000 evacuees. As more precise estimates emerged 
there followed a subsequent model on 22 April 2009 for the housing of 12,000 evacuees (Forcase, 
2010, p. 371). The governmental aims were embedded in a Legislative Decree n. 39, on 28 April 
2009 that stipulated the “urgent realization of houses…to allow the quickest allocation of persons 
whose houses have been destroyed or evaluated as not accessible by the competent public bodies” 
(art.2). The state programme based its hypothesis on the allocation of evacuees to new houses over 
10 months and allocated public funds of €400m for the construction of temporary housing (art.2, 
Legislative Decree no.39, 28.04.2009).  
5. Act 1.  A governmental programme of temporary housing: the Forcase Consortium 
5.1 The Forcase Consortium as a hybrid organization 
                                                             
3 Prior examples of short-term housing solutions may be found in the US and elsewhere during the 20th century (e.g. 




The principal programme to provide housing following the earthquake was the CASE project.4 Its 
object was to construct 184 anti-seismic and environmentally sustainable housing units on 19 sites 
to accommodate 15,500 residents (Alexander, 2013, p. 63). The Forcase consortium was formed on 
8 May 2009 to develop the project. The consortium comprised the Eucentre Foundation, a not-for-
profit organization for training and research on seismic engineering created by four public entities 
(University of Pavia, Superior Institute of Advanced Studies (IUSS) of Pavia, Institute of Geology 
and Volcanology, and the Department of Civil Defence); and two construction companies from the 
private sector - ICOP and Damiani. ICOP was selected given its experience in building foundation 
work and infrastructure (Pavia, 08.05.2009, prot.0008041, 05.05.2009). Damiani boasted 
considerable experience in house building. 
 
 
Forcase constituted a public/for-profit hybrid, akin to state-owned enterprises (Grossi et al., 2017, p. 
379). It embraced a combination of different logics (Brandsen and Karre, 2011). It is widely 
recognised that ‘hybridity’ is an ambiguous term (Thomasson, 2009). The Forcase consortium can 
be considered a hybrid organization at policy level, as it was purposely created during the post-
quake emergency and became embedded in a governmental humanitarian project to implement 
evacuee house building solutions. Indeed, it was specifically provided that all activities would “be 
executed for the Civil Defence for public interest purposes and without gaining any profit” (Letter 
by Calvi to Bertolaso, Pavia, 08.05.2009, p. 3). The organizational chart of the consortium refers to 
five main groups of activities, as portrayed in Figure 2. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Two groups (prototype project and general project) were responsible for planning and coordinating 
the project and the development of a standard building prototype. The ICOP company managed 
                                                             




logistics, materials procurement, digging activities and the positioning of anti-seismic plates in 19 
worksites. Having received bids ICOP contracted 14 companies to execute works at a cost of 
€123,720,708. The other private company, Damiani, coordinated and controlled the construction of 
standard houses in worksites. Following an open bidding process it contracted out the work to 16 
companies for a total of €330,000,000. The consortium also developed planning and directing 
activities in relation to the execution of construction work. Construction Direction (per Figure 2) 
was the responsibility of Professor Michele Calvi, President of Eucentre and of the consortium 
(Interview, Forcase and Eucentre Executive, 2019).  
 
Through its networks of public and private companies the Forcase consortium operated in a quasi-
market regime. It had the authority to institute and maintain accounting and controls relating to the 
project and utilised comprehensive performance measurement systems, akin to those evident in 
other areas (Grohs, 2014). Forcase was a hybrid organization not only in its mix of public/private 
‘souls’ and ownership, but also in its multi-aim structure (Grossi et al., 2017). It focused on policy 
implementation in the public interest and also on cost efficiency. As funding was derived from 
emergency resources provided by the state, external control was maintained by the Office of 
Administration and Accounting in the Department of Civil Defence. 
5.2 A building prototype 
The plan approved by the Department of Civil Defence published on 22 May 2009 indicates that the 
project focused on a building prototype constructed on anti-seismic plates. It was described thus: 
“The building prototype has a useful surface equal to circa 1,700m2 (1,900m2 with stairways and 
distribution), divided into 25-30 residences of different dimensions, able to host 80 persons” (CD 
Plan, 2009, p. 2). Underneath each plate were utilities and parking for 36 cars. The construction of 
150 such buildings was planned. Further, for every anti-seismic plate of 1,000m2, a further 2,500m2 





The plan included the design for the building prototype. Time and costs for the prototype were also 
detailed. It was stipulated that 150 plates would be constructed between June and September 2009, 
the first 30 being completed by July, and 30 more in each successive 20 days. The assembly, on the 
plates, of the prefabricated components of the first 30 buildings would commence in July and be 
completed within 80 days. Time would be allowed for furnishing and testing the buildings. By the 
end of September the first 900 houses would be ready for 2,400 evacuees (CD Plan, 2009, p. 28).   
Costs for 150 plates were estimated as follows:  
For each plate prototype (average values of reference): 
- Plate foundation and isolation (circa 2,200 m2 of total surface): €600,000.00; 
- Completed housing (circa 1,700m2 of useful surface and plate flooring): €2,100,000.00;  
- Furniture (circa 30 apartments): €200,000.00; 
- Complementary [paths and green spaces] (circa 2,500m2): €500,000.00 
Should we exclude complementary and urbanization works, the total costs per plate are 
€2,700,000.00, if we include them the grand total is €3,400,000.00 (ibid, p. 29).  
 
As reported by a key actor: 
…the above calculations were the results of meetings about standard construction costs 
which Forcase held among its internal technicians from CD and ICOOP and Damiani, and 
with delegates of professional associations representing the diverse construction 
technologies (i.e., Assobeton, Andil, Federlegno) who had provided standard costs relating 
to different building systems. The resulting standard cost of slightly more that €1,300.00 per 
square metre was taken as the benchmark (Interview, Engineers Forcase/Eucentre, ICOP jsc, 
and Damiani llc, 2019). 
 
5.3 Time-space management challenges and the development of an information reporting system 
The initial planning of new “seismically isolated and environmentally sustainable buildings” 
commenced in late April 2009, three weeks after the earthquake (Interview, Head of Civil Defence, 
2016). It was based on a ‘reasonable’ assessment of the demand for housing and in the absence of 




necessary despite this imprecision because building construction took at least four months and 
because replacement housing had to be provided before the next winter. The desirability of an 
accurate determination of demand was counterbalanced by “the utmost need to operate in the 
quickest time possible” (ibid). 
 
Importantly, for the planning and control of operations: 
…an ad hoc information reporting system, labelled c.a.s.e., was urgently developed. This 
treated all worksites as a unique mega-project. It was used within Forcase for coordination 
and monitoring purposes. Reports were divulgated on a daily basis to apex of the civil 
defence department, in order to enable immediate corrective actions in relation to deviations 
to any part of the project. … A team comprised of chief-engineers and myself as acting 
Head of the Administration and Accounting Office of the Civil Defence met several times in 
order to craft a detailed information reporting system (Interview, Head of the Civil Defence, 
confirmed by Forcase/Eucentre Executive, 2019). 
 
For each work area the c.a.s.e. reporting system provided information relating to the performance 
challenges that were faced on a daily basis. The system enabled the tracking of: a) the status of anti-
seismic plates relative to the installation of pipeline operations; b) the status of building 
construction, with percentage completion for macro-categories of operations; c) the status of 
urbanisation operations (streets, electric, waste and reclamation infrastructures, and pavements); d) 
the status of new green areas; e) the status of furnishing buildings; f) the state of materials 
procurement; g); estimates of the progressive financial value; and, h) corrective actions needed to 
adjust the worksite coordination plan (Interview, Head of the Civil Defence and Forcase/Eucentre 
Executive, 2019; see also Forcase, 2010, p. 185). 
An example of a), b), c), and d) content is shown in Figure 3. 





Figure 3 shows the daily report for the 21 plates in area 8. It charts progress towards the 
achievement of pre-defined operational steps of which there were six for foundation works and 
seven for house construction. The stage reached for each numbered plate was colour coded on a 
map. For example, in relation to the foundation works for 8.21 the map on the left indicates that the 
plates were completed by 19 October 2019. The map on the right indicates that the structures of the 
house had been constructed. The map on the right also indicates that most of the buildings were 
almost completed and assigned to evacuees (e.g., 8.7-8.8), while other houses had yet to be 
furnished and had not been assigned to evacuees (e.g., 8.5, 8.6). The report revealed progress 
towards completing buildings within the stipulated 80 days. Attention was also devoted to the 
progress of urbanisation works (sheet 1.3 in Figure 3), green works (1.4) as well as furniture 
procurement (1.5). This method of codification, classification and representation facilitated the 
control of each worksite. 
 
Comprehensive time-space project control of the 19 worksites was also facilitated by the 
information represented on a multi-dimension daily report. Information was provided relating to: a) 
daily and weekly weather forecasts; b) the cartography of the area and the 19 worksites. The state of 
advance of anti-seismic and buildings works was represented by different coloured emoticons. 
These might portray different situations (i.e., anticipating the work-plan; aligned to the work-plan; 
delay of the work-plan); c) works concluded by the end of the day, and forecast; d) the state of 
advancement on specific worksites; e) recapitulation of materials procurement related to anti-
seismic plates, walls and digging; f) advancement percentages, and number of evacuees potentially 
to be allocated to each building area; g) estimation of the economic value of production, divided by 
major classified operations-categories; h) risks and safety measures; i) various graphics and 




needed to adjust the plan for the worksite (Interview, Head of the Civil Defence and 
Forcase/Eucentre Executive, 2019; also Forcase, 2010, p. 186). 
 
An example of the a), c), d) and e) content is shown in Figure 4 (sheets 2, 8, 4 and 5, respectively). 
The figure highlights how the Civil Defence Department and Forcase treated the 19 building 
worksites as a unique mega-project to be planned, managed, executed and controlled in time and 
space.    
(Figure 4 about here) 
The relationship between Figures 3 and 4 can be seen by locating the data for Bazzano (highlighted 
in Figure 4, sheet 4, ‘Status of Works Advancement’). The daily and progressive procurement of 
materials is depicted in sheet 5 ‘Supplies for Plates’. Sheet 8 comprises a report showing percentage 
completion rates for the major construction operations as well as the number of evacuees who might 
potentially be accommodated in each building area. Estimates of the value of production for various 
processes and in total is provided in sheet 12.  
 
These practices are interesting for several reasons. First, in a moment of crisis, a bespoke 
comprehensive reporting system was constructed to surveil operational activity and space. Ready-
made technologies did not exist to measure performance in a post-disaster setting. Contrary to the 
usual practice in the globalized world, where international advisory agencies have a ‘ready package’ 
to solve performance management or financial control issues, in the focal case the technologies 
were crafted by the Civil Defence-Forcase team in order to address the specific issues arising in this 
relief project. Second, the combination of engineers and accountants who operated the system is 
evidence of de-compartmentalization and the assembling of calculative technologies from different 




and costing expertise featured in each operational step and was evident in the outputs of the c.a.s.e. 
information reporting system. Thirdly, the c.a.s.e. system emerged as a pivotal tool for the chrono-
spatial management of operations in the 19 worksites. It facilitated the coordination necessary to 
monitor diverse operations from the centralized procurement of materials to the installation of 
furniture in each apartment built. Fourthly, the role of classification as a technology of government 
is also apparent. Indeed, classification featured large in c.a.s.e. reports.  
 
Worksites were controlled at a distance by the administrative office of the Department of Civil 
Defence. The head of the latter had the power to sanction payments. Local monitoring of worksites 
was the responsibility of a building sites director or his delegate. Assisted by a team of experts, the 
building sites director might approve or contest the works completed by the companies who won 
bids. These examinations were concluded with a memorandum that might discuss the financial 
penalties imposed on companies that failed to meet work deadlines or had made building mistakes 
(Interviews with Head and Member of Administration and Accounting Office, 2019). One such case 
was company ‘XYZ’5, which was subject to the following penalty:  
Due to the delay in the consignment of the anti-seismic pillar 1.9 in Sant’Antonio, a penalty 
has been applied which, on the basis of art. 9 of the Contract stipulated on 04/08/2009 
repertoire 784, has been calculated as follows: 
Penalty sum:  16 days x 88 inhabitants x €200 = €281,600. 
(Technical Administrative Examination Minutes, XYZ, L’Aquila).  
Penalties were thus calculated according to the number of days lost to an evacuee in accessing their 
accommodation. Given that there were around 80 inhabitants per building the average penalty was 
€16,000 per building/day of delay. In the above calculation €200 represented the sum that the state 
would otherwise have spent per evacuee/day in providing alternative accommodation (Forcase, 
2010, p. 112).  
                                                             




5.4 Governing calculable evacuees and calculable urban spaces 
Another element of the c.a.s.e. reporting system was the allocation of calculable evacuees to 
calculable urban spaces. As stated earlier, a gross estimate of the number of houses needed was 
formulated three weeks after the earthquake. More accurate planning commenced from August 
2009 when the Department of Civil Defence, in tandem with the city of L’Aquila, undertook an 
accommodation survey (CD, 2009). By Ordinance of the City Mayor (n. 1188, on 17 September 
2009), ‘social lists’ were compiled by the Forcase consortium. These classified evacuee families 
and individuals and aligned them to customized houses (CD, 2009). 
 
The Ordinance of the City Mayor established the following categories to be considered in the 
allocation of families to homes (CD, 2010b, pp. 4-5): families comprising not less than three 
members; one parent family with a child; Italian or European Union citizenship, as well as non-
European citizenship with permission to stay; proximity to the location of a family’s damaged 
home; permanent residency or continuous stay in damaged houses classified as “E” or “F” or in the 
Red Zone of L’Aquila; lack of availability of accommodation in any other house occupied by a 
member of the family; and, presence of individuals with a handicap, elderly persons, or workers 
occupied in the Abruzzo region at the time of the earthquake, students and children of pre-school 
age. The preceding suggests that the planning and allocation of short term housing solutions 
required a “sociospatial ordering of resources” (Elden, 2007, p. 566) based on classifying segments 
of the population impacted by the disaster. In this way population and territory were linked in the 
devastated zones of the City of L’Aquila.   
 
The above groupings were augmented by further priority criteria, which also informed the 




accommodation under the CASE project, rather than for other temporary accommodation options; 
families that included a mobility-impaired person with particular accommodation needs; 
compliance with the ‘territoriality’ principle to be located close to pre-disaster residence; and, the 
size of family or cohabitation group.  
 
The allocation of calculable evacuees to calculable urban spaces was processed by Forcase using 
another purpose-built technology - ‘Jewel’ software (Interview, Forcase/Eucentre Executive, 2019). 
The municipality of L’Aquila specifically required that family nuclei, or units, from districts 
classified as restricted areas were to be assigned to specific CASE areas while units from non-
restricted areas were assigned to any another area of the CASE project (CD, 2010b, p. 6). The 
above criteria thus combined a series of spatial and population classifications to determine the 
allocation of accommodation. Lists of family nuclei comprising three or more persons, two persons, 
and households comprising one person, were generated using the software (CD, 2010b; Interview, 
Forcase/Eucentre Executive, 2019). 
 
As indicated earlier, the initial estimation of evacuee requirements in April 2009 led to a plan for 
150 new buildings. A further 15 were added before public works commenced, and another 20 
following the accommodation survey conducted in August 2009. That is, a total of 185 new 
buildings were planned to accommodate more than 15,000 evacuees from houses classified as “E”, 
“F”, or “Red Zone” (CD, 2010a, p. 29). Construction was based on the prototype building design 
referred to above (Forcase, 2010, p. 75), modified according to the specific needs of the population 
groups. Digging operations commenced on 8 June 2009 and the last pre-fabricated apartment was 
assigned on 19 February 2010 (Forcase, 2010, p. 17). The €812m of public monies needed to fund 
this recovery project was double the estimate made a few weeks after the earthquake (DCD, 





The ‘numericization’ of evacuees and their needs, and their allocation to new towns, required 
further calculations, not only to forecast the capacity of apartments to meet the specific 
requirements of those who would inhabit them, but also for the provision of urban spaces. Each new 
town was to be a separate neighbourhood with its own sanitation and electricity infrastructure 
(Forcase, 2010). As portrayed in Figure 3, the new towns were built on the basis of geometrical 
contours in small, demarcated territories with clear internal divisions, resonant of the principles 
identified by Foucault when discussing the creation or reconstruction of towns (2007, pp. 14-17).  
 
The construction of new towns involved 22km of streets, 50km of drainage conduits, 46 transformer 
rooms, 7 stations for telecommunications, and 2,000 pillars for street lighting (DCD, 2010a, pp. 29-
30). Particular attention was devoted to environmental considerations. 60% of the new buildings 
were to be classified as A or A+ for energy efficiency, 7,000m2 of solar panels were installed, as 
well as 35,000m2 of photovoltaic systems. 62 hectares of public green spaces were allocated, 11,000 
trees and 260,000 bushes were planted, and 30 entertainment areas were established (ibid, p. 30).  
 
Thus in the construction of new towns, a variety of technologies of exceptional government were 
deployed to identify and enumerate the impacted population and determine its housing needs. These 
included surveys, calculations, assessments, as well as “building designs and architectural forms” 
(Rose and Miller, 1992, p.  183). In the next section we explore the use of such technologies by 
organisations with hybrid characteristics in the reconstruction phase of post-disaster management. 
6. Act 2. Reconstruction consortia and a programme of permanent housing solutions  




Following the emergency stage of the disaster an Ordinance of the President of the Council of 
Ministries in Italy (n. 3833, 24 December 2009) stipulated that, from February 2010, the Governor 
of the Abruzzo Region would be replaced by the chief of the Civil Defence department. The 
Governor thereby assumed the powers and responsibilities of the Commissioner Delegated to 
Reconstruction. The Governor later reflected: 
…the recovery phase proved to be very difficult to plan and manage, not only in terms of 
public monies needed, but also in terms of a plethora of laws and decrees relating to the 
different needs of the afflicted population… Accordingly, the cessation of the emergency 
stage was postponed many times by the national government until 31 August 2012 (Law 7 
August 2012, n.134) (Interview, Former Governor of the Abruzzo Region, 2016). 
In March 2010 the Commissioner Delegated to Reconstruction issued a decree that clarified the 
procedures to be deployed during reconstruction (Decree of the Commissioner Delegated to 
Reconstruction 9 March 2010, n.3). His priorities, constrained by the limited public monies 
available, became the subject of public debate (http://www.comune.laquila.gov.it/pagina199_il-
piano-di-ricostruzione.html). Article 2 of the decree stipulated that arranging reconstruction plans in 
the historical centre of L’Aquila and in other centres was of outmost importance as was the 
demarcation of relevant areas and their populations. Accordingly, priority areas for intervention, 




In a subsequent decree issued on 3 June 2010 the Commissioner Delegated to Reconstruction 
stipulated the rules for the constitution of reconstruction consortia (n. 12, art.3). Documentary 
sources reveal that reconstruction consortia were to be formed as not-for-profit entities, governed by 
private law codes but acting on behalf and in the mutual interest of an association of real estate 
owners. Their constitution enabled them to make applications for public monies for reconstruction, 




and report on the building works to the Special Office for the Reconstruction of L’Aquila. 
Instalments of public monies would be received on the completion of various stages of construction.  
 
These reconstruction consortia exhibited hybridity characteristics similar to third sector community- 
based welfare associations in that they originated from the intersection of the state and communities 
(Grohs, 2014, p. 1229). In our case, the state funded the not-for-profit consortia to implement 
reconstruction plans to meet the needs of their communities. All consortium members were real 
estate owners from defined areas of the city. The latter operated as key actors who translated 
governmental reconstruction plans into practice. As Parlak and Gunduz (2015, p. 1159) indicated, 
“hybrid structures…rely on the coordination and cooperation between public administration, private 
sector organizations, non-governmental organizations, as well as individual and group initiatives”. 
Reconstruction consortia were an example of ‘group initiatives’. The deeds of the first consortia 
constituted after the L’Aquila earthquake were published on 7 March 2011, the last were published 
on 9 September 2019 (http://www.comune.laquila.it/pagina101_i-consorzi-per-la-
ricostruzione.html). A total of 1,757 reconstruction consortia were established. In this study we 
focus on the experience of the FRIROC consortium. 
 
In L’Aquila a draft reconstruction plan was initially approved on 9 February 2012 by the local 
authority. An opportunity was given to citizens to provide feedback by 16 March 2012 
(http://www.comune.laquila.gov.it/index.php?id_oggetto=18&id_doc=223&id_sez_ori=0&template
_ori=2). By the end of that month the final plan was approved. According to the local mayor, the 
“most important step for boosting reconstruction was the opening of a Special Office for the 
Reconstruction of L’Aquila” (Interview, former City Mayor, 2016). This office (hereafter referred 
to as USRA), together with a separate office dedicated to the reconstruction of other towns within 




public monies from the state and organized its distribution to the territories and populations 
impacted by the disaster (Interview, former USRA Director, 2016). The USRA allocated funding on 
receipt of requests, and examined and controlled expenses.  
 
Given the number of homes classified as “E” and “F” (as explained earlier) relative to the total 
number of damaged buildings (see Table 1), the key challenge posed in the Reconstruction Plan for 
L’Aquila was the reconstruction of private buildings (Reconstruction Plan, City of L’Aquila, 
Excerpt from Strategic Plans, 2011, p. 4). This was to be mainly performed by the reconstruction 
consortia established to manage reconstruction work on behalf of the interests and welfare of real 
estate owners. 
 
In the following sub sections we explore the calculative techniques used by the consortia in their 
pursuit of post-disaster reconstruction.  
 
6.2 The cartographical classification of space and population  
A Decree of the President of the Council of Ministries dated 4 February 2013, n.4, identified 
various typologies and modes of intervention for the reconstruction of the historical centre of 
L’Aquila (Art.3). The decree stipulated reconstruction of different areas, real estate “aggregato”, 
and identified the individual inhabitants eligible for funds. The term “aggregato” referred to “a set 
of non-homogeneous buildings, which are either connected or in contact” (www.usra.it/glossario/). 
Prior civil defence guidelines had classified real estate “aggregates” by reference to: the aggregate 
code number; real estate denomination; type of building, geographical coordinates; cadastral data; 
and, the owners of the building and its intended use (Guidelines for Reconstruction, Department of 




inhabitants were made visible and governable. Cartographical representation was prominent in this 
exercise. 
 
Figure 5, for example, contains extracts from the L’Aquila Reconstruction Map as at January 2013. 
Here, real estate aggregate code numbers are portrayed. Different colours are used to indicate the 
status of real estate aggregates. For example, the reconstruction of aggregates indicated in green (eg 
647, 182 and 78), have been approved. Those in light green (eg 145, 1065, 1069) represent 
examples where portions of aggregates have been proposed but not yet approved. Should we open 
the government’s geographical information system website 
(http://webgis.comuneaq.usra.it/mappa_def.php) and insert the aggregate code 1301 in Figure 5, it 
would be discovered that the aggregate is situated in “Piazza Chiarino 9” in downtown L’Aquila. 
Information about the building would also be disclosed. In early 2013, when Figure 5 was 
published, the aggregate was identified as proposed in November 2012 and recognised by the local 
government (as indicated by light grey shading). The geographical information system reveals that 
the contractor appointed to build the property has since received a final instalment of reconstruction 
funds of €3,093,636.88 for apartments classified as “E”. Figure 5 indicates how the Reconstruction 
Map of L’Aquila was used to identify reconstruction priorities. The cartography illustrates how 
space and society were partitioned and classified. The annotated city map appears as both a product 
and a tool of governmental intervention (Crampton, 2007, p. 224).  
(Figure 5 about here) 
6.3 The interplay of administrative, architectural, and engineering practices in reconstruction 
consortia 
Documentation submitted by reconstruction consortia, as examined, modified and approved by the 
USRA, allow us to decipher how knowledge was amassed through the interplay of architectural and 
engineering classifications and economic calculi. The following table, which draws on 




consortium’s application commenced in June 2013 (USRA, Prot. 40662) and was initially approved 
in March 2015 (USRA prot. 21638). Following requests for further information and assessments, 
funds were agreed on 11 May 2016. 
Table 2: USRA Sheet on Restoration Works Requested by the FRIROC Reconstruction 
























SU requested D3 V3 L2 (€1,100) 182.00% 228.01 456,476.02 
1 eligible  D3 V3 L2 (€1,100) 177.00% 228.01 443,935.47 
SU requested D2 V3 L2 (€1,100) 140.50% 194.29 300,275.20 
2 eligible  D2 V2 L1 (€1,000) 140.50% 194.29 272,977.45 
SU requested D3 V2 L2 (€1,100) 139.75% 296.87 456,363.41 
3 eligible  D3 V2 L2 (€1,100) 139.00% 296.87 453,914.23 
SU requested D3 V2 L2 (€1,100) 145.00% 154.47 246,379.65 
4 eligible  D2 V2 L1 (€1,000) 145.00% 154.47 223,981.50 
SU requested D1 V1 L1 (€1,000) 100.00% 18.54 18,540.00 
5 eligible  D1 V1 L1 (€1,000) 100.00% 18.54 18,540.00 
SU requested D3 V2 L2 (€1,100) 143.50% 308.67 487,235.60 
6 eligible  D3 V3 L2 (€1,100) 143.50% 308.67 487,235.60 
SU requested D3  V2 L2 (€1,100) 136.75% 111.05 167,046.96 
7 eligible  D3 V2 L2 (€1,100) 136.75% 111.05 167,046.96 
 
TotTa l 
Total     8,162.34 2,067,631.20 
Source: Project part second, 22 April 2016, provided by the Consortium President, USRA prot. 
6009, 22 April 2016.  
 
The second column in Table 2 refers to “damage level”. The procedure for determining this data 
was explained by the President of the relevant reconstruction consortium: 
The damage level was initially assessed by third party civil protection observers on the basis 
of a European macro-seismic scale (Ems98). This ranged from D0, or nil damage, to D5 - 
extremely serious damage. In the case of L’Aquila, there was level [D]1, that is, light 
damage, and levels 2-3 damage or medium to serious damage. (Interview, President of the 
Reconstruction Consortium, 2016).  
In order to facilitate the use of a common architectural language by consortium partners, a 
comprehensive instructions manual was produced (USRA, Seism Abruzzo 2009, Instructions 




classification (ibid, p. 32) and images demonstrating damage levels (ibid, pp. 20-21). These are 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
(Figure 6 about here) 
Consistent with Rose and Miller’s (1992, p. 183) suggestion that technologies of government may 
be actualised through standardised systems and vocabularies, the USRA also made available a 
‘Book of Sayings and Glossary’ (USRA, 25.02.2013). According to a consortium president and a 
real estate owner the latter encouraged the dissemination and use of a common disaster vocabulary 
for the representation of architectural damage. This vocabulary featured in reconstruction requests 
(Interview, President Reconstruction Consortium, 2016; Interview, real estate owner, 2016).  
 
Once damage levels had been determined and vulnerability status established as low, medium or 
high (i.e., V1, V2 and V3 in Table 2), a consortium president could formulate a request for 
reconstruction funds from the state, as calculated in Table 2. Standard reconstruction costs were 
used in parallel with architectural classifications. This enabled the performance of calculations 
according to the following levels of reimbursement: L0: €700 per m2; L1: €1,000 per m2; L2: 
€1,100 per m2; L3: €1,270 per m2; demolition reimbursement: €100 per m2 (Interview, Chief 
Engineer of FRIROC Consortium, 2016). These standard costs were suggested by a committee of 
scientific experts who adapted the classification from that used following the Umbria-Marche 
earthquake of 1997 (Interview, 2016 with a member of the L’Aquila Scientific Committee 2009, 
and past Co-Chair of the Umbria-Marche 1997 Earthquake Reconstruction Scientific Committee). 
The episode shows how the public funding of reconstruction schemes was aligned to architectural 
classification, again demonstrating the assembling of calculative technologies from diverse fields 





The reimbursement procedure also intertwined calculative practices and architectural surveys. The 
fifth column in Table 2 concerned percentage of funds requested. The amounts were dependent on 
the classification of property either as prestigious real estate in the City of L’Aquila (where the 
percentage could rise to 160%), or real estate safeguarded by laws relating to environmental-
historical protection (where the percentage could increase up to 200%). Percentage funds requested 
was multiplied by ‘total acknowledged surfaces’ subject to reconstruction (column six) to determine 
total funds requested.  
 
As shown in Table 2, there were two rows for each real estate unit. In the first row the amount 
“requested” by the consortium was stated, and in the second was the amount “eligible”. The 
Director of the USRA recalled, “for any request received, we established a control procedure which 
worked in parallel with the architectural/technical and administrative/economic evaluations” 
(Interview, former USRA Director, 2016). Internal checks by the USRA triggered changes to the 
“damage level” (e.g. Structural Unit (SU) 4 in Table 2), the “vulnerability level” (e.g. Structural 
Unit (SU) 2), the standard “reimbursement level” (e.g. Structural Unit (SU) 4), and the “percentage 
requested” (e.g. Structural Unit (SU) 1), thus generating total “eligible” amounts that differed from 
those “requested” by the reconstruction consortium. Having been subjected to the evaluation 
reported in Table 2, which established the maximum amount for eligible reconstruction works, 
more refined calculations of amounts requested by consortia were calculated, as per Table 3. 
Table 3: USRA Calculation of Amounts Requested and Eligible for Reconstruction by the 
FRIROC Consortium, June 2016  
  Amount requested Amount eligible 
Item Amount                     
(€) 
VAT                 
(€) 
Total                       
(€) 
Amount                     
(€) 
VAT                 
(€) 
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A.8 Other amounts 
(asbestos removal) 
19,680.00 1,968.00 21,648.00 19,680.00 1,968.00 21,648.00 















B. Other (Available) Sums             
B1 Tests and surveys 16,393.44 3,606.56 20,000.00 16,393.44 3,606.56 20,000.00  
B2 Technical expenses 269,879.51 59,373.49 329,253.00 267,580.78 58,867.77 326,448.55 




B4 Total (B1+B2+B3) 325,487.96 71,607.35 397,095.30 316,080.89 69,537.80 385,618.69 
C. Total (A9+B4)  2,421,094.53 281,168.01 2,702,262.54 2,403,259.48 2,403,259.48 2,681,515.14 
Source: USRA Final Provision on the Reconstruction Consortium denominated “FRIROC”. USRA 
prot. 9333, 29 June 2016.  
 
Administrative controls guided the USRA as to when not to permit further restoration works, as in 
category A.2. Here, “the amount recognized following authorizations by the competent 
Superintendence, should be separately funded by a specific contribution” (USRA, 11/05/2016, prot. 
06783, p. 3/5). A separate amount was also allocated for “asbestos removal” (i.e., row A.8). Much 
discussion concerned the sums requested in section B of Table 3 (Other (Available) Sums).  
 
By calculating the individual and total amounts requested and eligible per real estate unit, 
governmental practices represented the urban spaces to be rebuilt. Through classifying, comparing 
and hierarchizing requests, classes and categories were assigned to the people who inhabited spaces, 
thereby rendering them visible. The foregoing procedures were key to the acquisition and 
accumulation of governmental knowledge in the various city territories. The architectural content of 
the reconstruction plan, and the partitioning of its structural units inhabited by different citizens, 
was mirrored in the economic and technical budget and recapitulation sheets (Tables 2 and 3). The 
requests for funds by reconstruction consortia were validated following the comprehensive 
examination of USRA inspectors, from both an architectural/technical and from an 
economic/administrative perspective. Note the double-signature at the bottom of Table 3, 
representing the names of experts from different knowledge fields appointed to scrutinise the 
requests: i.e., an engineer for structural verification, and an architect for the 





7. Concluding discussion  
The aim of this paper has been to explore the calculative techniques that emerge at the intersection 
of disaster government and hybrid organizations. To date the literature on hybrid organizations has 
investigated a variety of scenarios (e.g., Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Miller et al., 2008; Grossi 
and Thomasson, 2015; Grossi et al., 2017; Johanson and Vakkuri, 2017; Gebreiter and Hidayah, 
2019). However, it has left unexplored the role such organizations play in post-disaster 
humanitarian operations, both in the short and long term processes of recovery and reconstruction. 
These are potentially important arenas for examining the “space between public and private forms 
of action” (Vakkuri and Johanson, 2018, p. 162). The study has attempted to fill this gap by 
“interacting more closely with practitioners in different roles…during a longer period of time” 
(Grossi et al., 2020, p. 271) and by exploring their experiences in practice. Further, in contrast to 
research on hybridity informed by institutional logics, variants of institutional theory and property 
rights theory, this research has focused on the art of government as applied to a target population in 
a situation where “a deserted territory was repopulated after a great disaster” (Foucault, 2007, p. 67) 
- a disaster that resulted in more than 65,000 evacuees.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in the Abruzzo region in April 2009, 35,000 found 
shelter in tents; others found refuge in hotels and private houses. 15,000 evacuees from the Red 
Zone of the City of L’Aquila were allocated to 185 new buildings in temporary new towns. At the 
time of writing only 5,000 remained in this accommodation, the remainder had returned to their 
restored homes. According to the USRA Director, by 2019 75% of the public monies allocated to 
reconstruction had been spent. The feared mass migration from L’Aquila and the consequent 
desertification of the city had not materialised (Interview, USRA Director, 2019). Data from the 
National Institute of Statistics suggest the effectiveness of the state’s approach. They indicate that 





In ‘Act 1’ of our history of the dislocation caused by a major trauma to a territory and its 
population, it has been shown that the state deployed diverse calculative techniques drawn from 
various disciplines. The “problematics of government” (Rose and Miller, 1992) arising from the 
disaster were investigated and solutions were devised using these technologies. In the emergency 
phase of the disaster the boundaries of society and space were demarcated. Technologies of 
government, elaborated by diverse experts were pivotal to the acquisition and accumulation of 
knowledge about disaster impacts, the construction of recovery programmes, and informing debates 
and diagnoses (Miller and Rose, 1990, pp. 6-7). The list of technologies called into action in the 
focal case was extensive. In addition to accounting it included “building designs and architectural 
forms” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 183). It included cartographic representations that generated 
“discourses on territorial partitioning, boundary making and the politics of spatial knowledge” 
(Crampton, 2007, pp. 223-224). ‘Social lists’ (Walker, 2004; Servalli, 2013) of the impacted 
population assisted the “sociospatial ordering of resources” (Elden, 2007, p. 566) by matching 
calculable evacuees to calculable short-term housing solutions. Governing is indeed, “a science of 
endless lists and classification” (Gordon, 1991, p. 10; Bowker and Star, 1999, p. 16). 
 
The analysis of the Forcase Consortium has shown how performance was measured on a daily 
basis, and involved comparisons over time and space. Financial and non-financial measures were 
taken for various purposes, ranging from internal planning, coordination, decision-making and 
deviance analysis, as well as for external accountability. The c.a.s.e. information reporting system 
embraced an ‘avalanche’ of non-financial performance indicators (Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006, p. 
97). These were not only pivotal to daily time-space planning and control, but also allowed the Civil 
Defence department to govern and monitor at a distance the decentralized housing activities of the 





The different logics sustaining private-public ‘souls’ (Brandsen and Kerrè, 2011; Skelcher and 
Smith, 2015), and the intertwining of technologies drawn from engineering, architecture and 
accounting, triggered innovation in performance management and the development of an 
information reporting system that translated a governmental programme into practice. As ready-
made technologies did not exist before the disaster, diverse experts were engaged to assemble a 
made-to-measure information system. Experts also intervened to craft software for evacuee-housing 
allocation. This was redolent of the functioning of accounting as a form ‘bricolage’ where 
calculative technologies from different disciplines are combined to address a particular problem 
(Miller, 1998). The engagement of various experts itself represented a form of de-territorialization 
of subject disciplines (Mennicken and Miller, 2012, p. 24). These attempts by a hybrid organisation 
and the Civil Defence department to formulate housing solutions in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake laid the foundations for the development of longer-term solutions in the reconstruction 
phase.  
 
In ‘Act 2’ of our research we discussed the macro-level governmental programme to implement 
long-term housing solutions. We analysed the micro-level operations of FRIROC, a reconstruction 
consortium, from the time of its constitution to the completion of rebuilding work in a particular 
area. In the reconstruction phase experts elaborated public programmes designed to restore the 
economic life and welfare of impacted populations and territories. Other technologies were 
mobilised to facilitate implementation. Various scientific classifications were devised to determine 
the ‘damage level’ and ‘vulnerability level’ of buildings and these were attached to a scale of 
standard reconstruction costs and reimbursements. These classifications and calculations were used 
to determine the funding required for rebuilding works on each structural unit. The in/outflow of 




USRA office generated new identities for individuals and families through the labels of ‘real estate 
aggregates’. Technologies of government relating to reconstruction also included the 
standardization of systems and vocabularies (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 183). This was manifested 
in the production of instruction manuals and glossaries that introduced common procedures and 
languages among experts drawn from accounting, engineering and architecture.  
 
As stated earlier, this research represents the first longitudinal study in accounting and 
accountability that charts post-disaster operations from the emergency to the reconstruction phase. 
It embraces an 11-year observation period. More longitudinal and cross-comparative studies are 
needed to unveil the deployment of calculative practices where diverse hybrid organizations are 
called into action in the aftermath of disasters. There have been numerous other seismic events in 
Italy (such as in Macerata, Marche region, 2016-2017 (see Ricciardelli, Manfredi and Antonicelli 
(2018), and Siena, Tuscany, 1798 (see Carungu and Paolicelli (2018)), and elsewhere, in historical 
and contemporary settings, that merit investigation. Furthermore, there remains much to learn about 
the role played by hybrid organizations in the operation of mega-projects, intended either to prevent 
disasters (e.g., flooding in Rotterdam and Bad Ems, Germany), or to repair communities in post-
disaster scenarios.  
 
Geophysical disasters such earthquakes represent one of numerous events that cause large-scale 
human suffering and have profound economic, social and political consequences. Amid concerns 
about the emergence of ‘catastrophic societies’, it is hoped that the accounting research community 
will turn its attention to other crises, whether they be related to climate change, environmental 
degradation, inequality, military aggression or biological shock, where calculation likely features 
large in their management (Elliott and Turner, 2012, pp. 165-168; Diamond, 2005; Tainter, 1988; 




of economic and social collapse. As Foucault (2007, pp. 57-67) observed, and as contemporary 
experience amply demonstrates, in the past and in the present epidemics are important sites for the 
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Appendix B. Interviews 
Interviewee Role played before/after the disaster City, Year 
of 
interview(s) 
Head of Civil Defence Head of the Administration and Accounting Office of the CD at 





Head of the CD’s 
Administration and 
Accounting Office 
Head of the Administration and Accounting Office of the CD and 
former member of this office at the time of 2009 disaster. 
Rome 
2019 
Member of the CD’s 
Administration and 
Accounting Office 
Member of the Administration and Accounting Office of the CD, 








In 2009-2010 held a key position in CASE Project, supporting 
civil defence work, including day-to-day coordination and control 





Delegate of the Forcase Consortium. Responsible for several tasks 
relating to buildings. 
By phone 
2019 
Engineer, at Damiani 
Construction Company 
llc. 
Engineer from one of the two private companies who were 
partners in the Forcase Consortium. Member of the Directional 




Engineer, at ICOP 
construction company 
jsc. 
Engineer of one of the two private companies who were partners in 
the Forcase Consortium. This company had site responsibility for 
plates and infrastructure.  
By phone 
2019 
Former Mayor of the 
City of L’Aquila 
City Mayor before, during and after the disaster, until June 2017.  L’Aquila 
2016 
Former Governor of 
the Abruzzo Region 
Governor of the Abruzzo Region before, during and after the 
















Member of a special group of USRA advisors comprising experts 
appointed by the Italian government. Also involved in the 
classification of standard reconstruction costs. 
Rome 
2016 
President of the 
Consortium-FRIROC 
The gatekeeper of architectural-engineering-accounting and non-




Chief-Engineer of the 
Consortium-FRIROC 
Involved in diverse projects to reconstruct damaged buildings in 







Owner of a real estate 
unit 








Figure 1: Territories and Populations Struck by the L’Aquila Earthquake as Defined by ‘The 
Seismic Crater’ 
 
Source: USRA Special Office for the Reconstruction of L’Aquila, 2019. 
  
Figure 2: Organizational Chart of the Forcase Consortium 
 















Figure 4: Extract from a C.A.S.E. daily report (No. 134, relating to 19 worksites, 19th October 2019) 
 
Source: Forcase/Eucentre. 








Figure 6: Damage Classification in the USRA Instructions Manual 
• D1 light damage: no structural damage and negligible non-structural elements; capillary cracks in a few wall 
panels; small pieces of plaster fallen, and in rare cases falls of high parts of buildings. 
• D2 non-structural moderate damage, cracks to walls, falls of quite large pieces of plaster, partial collapse of 
flues. 
• D3 medium damage with wide cracks in diverse wall panels, damage to cornices, collapse of non-structural 
elements. 
• D4 serious damage to structure, collapse of portions of walls, partial collapse of cornices and slabs. 
• D5 very serious damage to structures, close to collapse or total collapse. 
 
    
 
 
D1 - light damage D2 – medium-
moderate damage 
D3 – medium-serious 
damage 




Medium-serious damage D2-D3: Damage mechanism 
found with high frequency.  X-Cracks in the walls or in 
inter-floor bands. 
Medium-serious damage D2-D3: Masonry maintains 
bearing capacity even in the presence of wide cracks. 
  
Very-serious damage D4-D5: Macroscopic dislocations 
of structural components. Partial or total collapse. 
Very-serious damage D4-D5: transversal cracks in the 
main walls. 
Source: USRA, SEISM Abruzzo (2009), Instructions Manual (2013, pp. 20, 21, 32). 
